# Swiss RM Move Economics: EAM-to-EAM vs Bank-to-EAM *Companion to research-rm-psychology.md (do not duplicate). Focus: revenue-share norms by move type, the bank-RM move calculus against low follow rates, EAM-to-EAM dynamics, EAM diligence gaps, and founder setups. [S] = sourced with URL, [I] = inference. Compiled Oct 2026.* --- ## 1. Revenue share norms when moving EAM-to-EAM ### The structural range: 25–40% attributed, 40–70% payout-scheme headlines - **Executive Partners (Geneva headhunter)**: for an RM joining or founding an EAM, take-home pay is "a defined share, typically **between 25 and 40 percent of the revenue the firm attributes to their book, net of operational costs**." A CHF 500m book at ~70bps (~CHF 3.5m revenue) can yield CHF 800k–1.2m personal comp [S: https://www.execpartners.ch/en/insights/private-banking-compensation-revenue-grid]. - **vapa.ch (guide for bankers considering independence)**: independent advisers "typically retain about **40–60% of client fees after platform and operating costs**, versus roughly **20–30% in a traditional private-banking payout**" [S: https://vapa.ch/swiss-independent-wealth-management-blog/the-swiss-private-banker-guide-to-independent-wealth-management/]. Note the two sources reconcile: execpartners' 25–40% is share of *attributed book revenue*; vapa's 40–60% is retention of *client fees after platform costs* — different bases. - **Headline splits of 70/30 and 50/50 both circulate**: vapa explicitly dissects a "70/30 revenue-sharing arrangement" vs a "50/50 split" and warns the higher headline percentage often comes with variable infrastructure deductions, an office-sharing DIY setup, or a stripped-back platform — "who keeps the 30 net?" The percentage that looks better can position the RM worse; compare in absolute CHF after all deductions [S: https://vapa.ch/understanding-relationship-manager-payouts-linked-to-turnover/]. - **80%+ gross offers exist and are flagged as red flags by EAM owners themselves** (Patrick Stauber, Marcuard Heritage): "offers boasting lofty total compensations, often exceeding 80 per cent of gross revenues, might appear tempting" — demand the P&L, historical payouts over 3–4 years, and cost-allocation discipline. Stauber's counter-rule: "No firm can operate with only a 30% top-line revenue share unless your new employer engages in window-dressing pending a sale" [S: https://www.wealthbriefing.com/html/article.php/Compensation-Models-For-Wealth-Manager-RMs:-A-Look-At-Switzerland's-EAMs ; https://vapa.ch/compensation-as-a-relationship-manager/]. - **Observed market data point**: AlphaSwiss Partners (Geneva EAM, 17 people) ran a LinkedIn job ad for "Client Officer / Assistant Relationship Manager **at 60%**" (May 2025). That is a 60% payout advertised for a *junior* support-to-RM role — a useful anchor that 60% is within the upper-normal band for Swiss EAM hiring, not an outlier founding-team-only number [S: https://linkedin.com/company/alphaswiss-partners]. - **Recruiter job ads rarely state a percentage** — a survey of current Swiss EAM hiring ads (Michael Page, NonStop, Sercanto, jobborse) shows the formula recurring: "entrepreneurial compensation model with significant long-term upside," "attractive revenue participation," "unlimited/uncapped bonus," "participate directly in the value you create." Percentages are negotiated privately; the *guarantee* and equity terms are where differentiation is signalled [S: https://www.michaelpage.ch/job-detail/independent-relationship-manager-mfd/ref/jn-022026-6949667 ; https://mail.eurojobs.com/jobs/27803173/independent-relationship-manager-27803173]. One rare salary-banded listing: ARP Vermögensverwaltungs AG (Zurich boutique in the Aquila partner network) posts CHF 120k–180k for an independent RM with own book [S: https://jobborse.ch/vermogensverwalter_zurich-c122023/2026-09-arp-vermogensverwaltungs-ag_i4211264436]. - **vapa model taxonomy** (the three hiring structures): fixed salary+bonus (transition year / juniors), **revenue sharing** (experienced RMs with established book), **partnership** (rev share + profit + equity — "senior bankers who want to build the firm"). Critical negotiation points: revenue base definition, pre-split cost deductions, transition guarantee, and — decisive for EAM-to-EAM — **exit rights: can you sell your share of the client book when you leave or retire?** [S: https://vapa.ch/private-banker-to-independent-wealth-manager-guide/] ### Comparison against the 50%-share incumbency problem - Bank side: formula grids top out around **20% of net revenue** at EFG (the most transparent Swiss bank model), 15% in the first four years of tenure; discretionary-model banks offer no formula at all and Oliver Wyman data show RM payout uncorrelated with RM profitability, with 25–45% of private-bank RMs unprofitable to their employer [S: https://www.execpartners.ch/en/insights/private-banking-compensation-revenue-grid ; https://www.nzz.ch/wirtschaft/der-kampf-um-die-private-banker-ld.1831942]. - vapa's comparison table: bank base + discretionary bonus with "no direct link between the revenue generated and the payout"; EAM: "a clear percentage of gross revenue after direct costs… payments typically made quarterly" [S: https://vapa.ch/swiss-independent-wealth-management-blog/wealth-managers/independent-wealth-managers-compensation-models/]. - **Implication [I]**: a 60% EAM offer (65% founding step-up) is roughly **2–3x the bank-grid ceiling** on an identical revenue base, and comfortably above the modal EAM-hire band once the incumbent's EAM is paying 40–55%. The pitch against an incumbent small-EAM paying 50% is not "we pay more" but: (a) your 50% is of a book the founder's distraction keeps shrinking, (b) our 60→65% comes with retro-free fee economics (no retrocycle revenue hidden from the base), and (c) a written exit/sale-of-book-share clause most incumbents don't offer [I]. --- ## 2. Why bank RMs move to EAMs despite the ~40% follow rate The cost side is brutal and known: "around 40% of the AUM stated in the RM's business plan actually lands within 18 months at the new bank" — the number "every insider knows but rarely says aloud" (Gil Chalem, Executive Partners) [S: https://www.finews.ch/news/banken/72635-swiss-banking-relationship-manager-kunden-wechsel-bluff-gil-m-chalem-executive-partners-finanzplatz-schweiz-credit-suisse]. What compensates: 1. **The 40–60% vs 20–30% payout multiple more than prices the follow-rate risk.** Worked comparison [I from sourced numbers]: a CHF 500m bank book at 20–30% effective retention of client fees vs the same book at an EAM at 40–60% — even at a 40% asset follow rate, an EAM RM keeping 50% of fees on CHF 200m transferred ≈ CHF 700k gross fee income × 50% = CHF 350k, roughly a bank RM's full package, with upside as the book regrows and new origination compounds. The vapa guide states it directly: "a lower base with a fair revenue share often pays more after two to three years than a bank package – but only if clients follow and stay" [S: https://vapa.ch/private-banker-to-independent-wealth-manager-guide/]. 2. **Cumulative vs reset accounting.** Francesco Magistra (ex-UBS, now EAM owner, finews interview series): at a bank "the counter does not go back to zero on January 1 each year; it is cumulative" at an EAM — no more mandated goals, and "the customers who follow you because of your skills are yours." Also the W-2 structure point: "the salary paid by an independent asset management firm is only an advance on a service yet to be provided" — an RM willing to forgo the advance negotiates higher share instead [S: https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/59835-francesco-magistra-eam-independent-asset-manager-self-employed-clients]. 3. **Ownable asset / enterprise value.** Direct contractual client ownership, open architecture, and "a business with genuine enterprise value, not just annual compensation" [S: https://vapa.ch/swiss-independent-wealth-management-blog/the-swiss-private-banker-guide-to-independent-wealth-management/]. Partnership model = rev share + profit + equity + saleable book share at exit [S: vapa guide]. 4. **Autonomy and product-neutrality** — the recurring first-person rationale: freedom to advise without product push, internal KPIs, office politics (mover testimonial [S: https://asianprivatebanker.com/private-banking-wealth-management/why-i-left-traditional-banking-for-a-conflict-free-wealth-management-model/]); Magistra: "There are EAM factories that are not much different from banks, and there are others" — a caution that the autonomy gain depends on the firm chosen [S: finews 59835]. 5. **Career longevity.** Over-50 client advisers are pushed out of banks ("financial institutions have increasingly sought to get rid of the more expensive and rebellious older cohorts"); EAMs let bankers stay active past retirement age (Reto Hossli, DR-RH matching firm, ex-CS) [S: https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/45619-eam-private-banker-move-dr-rh-reto-hossli-daniel-renner-cs]. 6. **Lower switching friction out of the bank world.** Magistra again: joining an EAM, "don't sign a contract for life. If the EAM firm doesn't meet your expectations, switching is much easier than leaving a bank. Changing from one EAM firm to another requires only a few administrative signatures" — i.e. the *option value* of a first EAM move includes a cheap second move [S: finews 59835]. 7. **Access is the real barrier, not willingness.** "90 percent of the switches from private banks to independent asset managers are based on existing relationships" — the sector is opaque and "bankers who don't have ex-colleagues at the independents will find it all the more difficult" (Hossli). Structured matchmaking firms exist precisely because permeability is low [S: finews 45619]. 8. **Selection is on the book's portability, and everyone prices it.** Hiring institutions apply their own portability discount to the business plan; RMs with self-originated, decade-built, discretionary-mandate books clear the bar [S: https://www.execpartners.ch/en/insights/what-is-a-relationship-manager-worth]. So the RM who moves is self-selected: the ones with portable, personal-service-dominated books face the least 40%-risk (see BGer 4A_116/2018 precedent in research-rm-psychology §3). --- ## 3. EAM-to-EAM move data **No hard follow-rate dataset exists comparing bank→EAM vs EAM→EAM.** What the record does support: - **EAM-to-EAM mobility is a recognized, growing channel.** Thomas Bossard, Stellar Executive Search: RMs "are no longer simply moving from private banks to independent asset managers. They are increasingly moving **between EAMs, family offices, multi-family offices, dedicated platforms** and other entities" — described as structural, not cyclical [S: https://www.sphere.swiss/en-gb/medias/les-clients-ne-suivent-pas-un-rm-uniquement-sur-la-base-dune-relation-personnelle]. - **Legal/administrative friction collapses on a second move.** Magistra: "Changing from one EAM firm to another requires only a few administrative signatures. And, of course, a credible and understandable explanation for your clientele." No bank-employer garden leave, no intra-bank non-compete against a bank competitor, no deferred-comp forfeiture — the tax on the move is far lower [S: finews 59835]. - **Client-side reasoning why follow should be better on a second move [I]**: (a) the client has already demonstrated willingness to move assets once — the bank-brand-inertia segment was screened out in move one; what remains is relationship-selected; (b) the client has experienced the independent model (multi-custodian, named-person service) and its incremental benefit vs a bank is smaller than the bank→independent delta; (c) a second EAM move rarely changes the custody banks — the client's accounts, structures, and KYC files can often stay put while only the EAM mandate letter changes, removing the onboarding/KYC friction that kills first moves (cf. the 35%-of-target Zurich case in research-rm-psychology §3). Counter-risk: Stellar's warning applies with full force — "clients do not follow an RM solely on the basis of a personal relationship… they also assess the quality of the platform, investment expertise and the overall client experience," and "trust is not automatically transferred. It must be rebuilt between the RM, the clients and the new structure" [S: sphere.swiss]. - **Consolidation is itself an EAM-to-EAM pipeline.** Stauber: the dominant consolidation mode is "silent" — "licence returns, relationship manager transfers, successions handed to a competitor without a transaction sitting on top"; "Client advisors are moving, books in hand, to firms where the succession question has already been resolved" (Marcuard Heritage, finews). Roughly a third to a half of Swiss IAMs disappeared 2020–2025, ~80% of it off-market [S: https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/72626-independent-asset-managers-the-m-and-a-illusion-is-over-patrick-stauber-marcuard-heritage ; https://vapa.ch/swiss-eam-consolidation/ ; https://wealthsummit.ch/the-five-year-countdown-for-switzerlands-independent-wealth-managers/]. **Recruiting implication [I]**: the RM unhappy at an underperforming/incumbent-risk EAM is the natural buyer of our story — their book is already portable *within the independent world*, their clients have no bank to retreat to, and our FINMA+SEC dual setup + named succession path directly answers the question their current firm can't. --- ## 4. The "underperforming current EAM" angle: what RMs diligence, and what they miss ### What they typically DO check - Compensation mechanics: revenue base definition, pre-split deductions, 3–4 years of actual payout history, cost-allocation volatility (Stauber/Marcuard checklist) [S: wealthbriefing comp models ; vapa]. - Guarantee while clients transfer; exit/retirement sale of book share [S: vapa guide]. - Platform/custodian breadth and investment-office quality (Decalia-style differentiators: co-investment alignment, personalization, proximity to decision-makers) [S: https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/69769-10-years-decalia-wealth-management-asset-management-private-markets-interview-rodolfo-de-benedetti-geneva]. ### What they typically MISS [I, each grounded in sourced failure data] 1. **Succession and key-person risk at the receiving firm.** 58% of Swiss IAMs have succession only partially or not arranged; 85% judge sub-CHF 50m firms non-viable [S: https://wealthsummit.ch/wp-content/uploads/2026/03/Independent_Asset_Managers_In_Switzerland_2026.pdf]. An RM joining a founder-centric firm inherits the same trap in ten years. Marcuard/Stauber: "In our industry, the client follows the advisor, not the legal entity… the client book is not being sold — it is moving on" [S: finews 72626]. 2. **Identity/culture articulation.** SEAMIx: average Swiss EAM identity score 1.57/5; 55 firms express *no* identity element. "A firm that cannot articulate what it stands for cannot explain to the candidate what they would be joining beyond the economics" [S: https://backend.emeraldwealthpartners.com/media/uploads/SEAMix_Report_2026.pdf]. 3. **Genuine scale economics.** Median firm: ~3 employees, ~CHF 60–140m AUM (FINMA median 61m; VSV median 140m) with supervisory costs up ~5x in two years (FINMA non-directly attributable costs CHF 1.86m → 9.25m, 2022–24) — a 60% payout at a shrinking micro-EAM can be worth less than 50% at a scaling one [S: wealthsummit five-year-countdown ; yearbook.vsv-asg.ch]. EAM-to-EAM movers should re-run the payout model at the *destination's* cost base, not the headline % [I]. 4. **Whether the platform is a factory.** "There are EAM factories that are not much different from banks" [S: finews 59835]; Tramondo's Wicky Meyer: the RM's question to any recruiting firm — "Ist das versprochene unterstützte Unternehmertum gelebte Realität – oder nur ein gutes Narrativ im Recruiting? Wird aus mehr Freiheit am Ende bloss mehr Risiko auf der eigenen Schulter? Ist es ein echter Schritt nach vorne – oder einfach dieselbe Politik in einem neuen Kleid?" [S: https://www.finews.ch/service/advertorials/72668-tramondo-fuer-relationship-manager-wenn-der-naechste-wechsel-der-richtige-sein-soll] 5. **The platform/consolidator's intent toward autonomy.** WealthSummit: models that "turn entrepreneurs into employees and replace advisory judgement with standardised corporate processes" fail — "Clients who left banks consciously will simply leave again"; federated roll-up arbitrage (the ~90-firm US analog) collapsed when cheap financing ended [S: https://wealthsummit.ch/what-independent-wealth-managers-need-most-now/]. Cinerius/Quaestor "nevertheless struggled to build convincing platforms despite the large number of IAMs in the market" [S: FIN21 PDF]. ### EAM failure/consolidation context (what diligence should surface) - **1,000+ firms told FINMA they wouldn't apply for a licence; 130 withdrew; ~700 never engaged a supervisory organisation** — one-third to one-half of the pre-2020 market exited by 2025, leaving 1,532 licensed firms [S: wealthsummit five-year-countdown]. - FINMA's 2025 statement: 1,699 applications by end-2022, >94% processed by Feb 2025; consolidation is "80% silent, 20% visible" (Stauber) [S: vapa swiss-eam-consolidation]. - Deloitte expects 30–50 transactions/year and 500–1,000 firm exits over the coming decade; visible deals: Swiss Life/ZWEI (2025), PKB/Belvoir, EFG/Cité Gestion (2024), 9 announced H1-2025 (PwC) [S: wealthsummit what-independent-wealth-managers-need-most-now]. - Consolidation-acquirers (Cinerius/SSI, Quaestor) struggled to build convincing platforms [S: FIN21 PDF] — evidence that "bigger" is not automatically "better to join" [I]. --- ## 5. Founder setups that scare or attract RM candidates ### Scare - **Distracted founder / one-man show**: 14 one-person IAMs surveyed show inconsistent substitution arrangements, a third with no regulated substitute — direct operational and regulatory risk if the founder is unavailable [S: FIN21 PDF]. The RM reads this as: my book's support depends on one person's attention. - **Founder-value concentration**: "Value creation, client trust, and culture are disproportionately tied to a single person or a small founding group. What made these firms successful in the past makes them difficult to transfer today" [S: finews 72626]. The RM joining at 45 inherits an unbuyable seat. - **Milking-the-book owners**: ~two-thirds of decision-makers over 51, over half without succession — "If you plan to wind down in five years, you milk the book rather than reinvest in it" (Stauber). No tech reinvestment → platform decay → client attrition → shrinking 50% share [S: vapa swiss-eam-consolidation]. - **Asset-supplier framing**: "Whoever sees you primarily as an asset supplier has already told you what you're really for"; all-EAMs-advertise-the-same (FINMA umbrella, compliance, reporting, IT) recruiting [S: Tramondo advertorial]. - **Opaque or headline-inflated economics**: 80%+ gross offers hiding cost allocations; variable infrastructure deductions behind 70/30 headlines; no written P&L or payout history [S: wealthbriefing ; vapa turnover article]. - **Retro/product revenue dependence** (window-dressing-pending-sale firms): Stauber's "no firm can operate with only a 30% top-line share unless… window-dressing pending a sale" — the inverse: firms whose economics depend on retrocycles and house-adjacent revenue are conflicted platforms the RM must re-sell to clients [S: vapa compensation-as-a-relationship-manager]. *Our retro-free stance neutralizes exactly this fear [I].* - **Consolidator absorption risk**: platforms that convert partners into employees (WealthSummit warning) [S: wealthsummit need-most-now]. ### Attract - **Named succession solved**: Bruellan (Geneva, ~CHF 2bn, 35+ staff) staged a generational handover from a position of strength — founders exiting operations, internal partner promoted through a visible track (client adviser 2020 → partner 2024 → managing partner) [S: https://www.finews.ch/news/finanzplatz/72751-bruellan-neue-geschaeftsleitung-antoine-spillmann-jean-paul-tissieres-philippe-moser-annick-baud-malek-dahmani]. RMs joining firms with a *published* leadership path can see their own trajectory. - **Well-capitalized family-office backing**: the Michael Page platform listing markets exactly this ("financially backed by a prominent family office, ensuring long-term stability, strategic patience, strong capitalization… fast onboarding, 100% remote") [S: michaelpage JN-022026-6949667]. - **Partnership/equity track with exit rights**: rev share + profit + equity + saleable book share (vapa model 3) [S: vapa guide]; Azura Partners: ~60 employees, 9–10 partners, multi-jurisdictional platform, partner-level economics attracting 20-year bankers [S: https://index.fame.so/show/how-to-keep-your-money/wealth-management-client-trust-multi-bank-solutions-iskra-martin-of-azura-partne]. - **Institutional quality with entrepreneurial freedom**: the Stellar synthesis — "Today's most successful firms combine entrepreneurial independence with institutional quality: robust governance, sound compliance, transparent reporting, strong custodian relationships, recognised investment expertise and a disciplined investment process" [S: sphere.swiss]. - **Genuine sparring beyond onboarding**: "The partnership doesn't end with onboarding — in daily business we are your sparring partner" (Tramondo) [S: Tramondo]; investment-office support (Decalia's monthly independent macro view; proximity of RM to executive committee) [S: finews 69769]. - **Growth with visible M&A capacity**: Pleion (Héritier) explicitly hires "relationship managers who are leaving banks or had set up their own independent asset management companies" and brands an expansion path [S: https://www.finews.com/news/english-news/36030-patrick-heritier-pleion-plurigestion-antoine-darioli-geneva-bern-zurich-monaco-luxembourg-dubai-africa]; SSI/Cinerius and Swisspartners position scale + rejuvenation hiring post-CS [S: finews 71886 ; 58922]. --- ## 6. Synthesis for the recruiting firm [I unless noted] 1. **Our 60/65% is a top-of-band, defensible number** — above execpartners' 25–40% attributed-revenue norm and vapa's 40–60% net-retention band, at the level AlphaSwiss advertises even for junior staff, and 2–3x any bank grid. Position it as "top-decile share with written mechanics," not as a headline: the market's own gatekeepers (Stauber) have trained RMs to distrust >80% gross offers. Show the P&L, the deductions, the payout history — we will have none to show as a startup, so show the *pro-forma* under 3 fee/tier scenarios instead [I]. 2. **Against incumbent 50%-share EAMs, the wedge is not the extra 10 points** — it is (a) retro-free = revenue base with nothing hidden from it, (b) succession answerability: our structure has no founder-milking scenario, (c) exit rights in writing. The underperforming-incumbent RM has already lived the failure modes in §5; name them. 3. **The EAM-to-EAM mover is our highest-conversion, lowest-risk target**: no bank non-compete/garden-leave overhang, KYC files largely static, clients pre-selected for mobility, and the destination diligence (custodians unchanged, licence already held) is trivial. Magistra's "a few administrative signatures" line is the pitchable summary [S: finews 59835]. 4. **Bank-RM targets**: compensate the 40% follow-rate fear with (a) guarantee sized ≥18 months (market-norm arithmetic), (b) W-2-employed-with-share structure — they keep a salary floor during ramp, unlike greenfield founders, (c) cumulative accounting story (Magistra), (d) peer proof: introduce them to our first founding RMs [I]. 5. **What the candidate will fail to check, we should volunteer unprompted**: succession/governance map, identity document, cost base and payout pro-forma, "not a factory" evidence. Volunteering the diligence they'd miss converts distrust into differentiation — the SEAMIx identity-score 1.57/5 market means almost no competitor does this [S: SEAMix ; I for the tactic].